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{1, 2} (see Anam et. al [1]). The profit of firm Fi is given
by
pii(q1, q2) = (a− bq1 − bq2 +∆)q1 − 12q
2
i .
Public firm F1 maximizes social welfare W which is de-
fined as the sum of producer surplus and consumer sur-
plus:
W =
∫ Q
0
p(x)dx− pQ+ pi1(q1, q2) + pi2(q1, q2)
=
∫ Q
0
p(x)dx− C1(q1)− C2(q2)
=
b
2
Q2 + (a− bQ+∆)Q− 1
2
q21 −
1
2
q22 . (1)
We will analyse the four possible cases separately.
2.1 Case 1: (L,L)
In this case, both firms move late; so, firms decide their
outputs after ∆ is revealed to both firms at the end of
stage 1. Maximizing firms’ objective functions, we get
the following equilibrium output levels:
q1(∆) =
(b+ 1)(a+∆)
b2 + 3b+ 1
,
q2(∆) =
a+∆
b2 + 3b+ 1
.
Therefore, social welfare is given by
AL,L =W =
(
b3 + 5b2 + 8b+ 2
)
σ2
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
+
+
(
b3 + 5b2 + 8b+ 2
)
a2
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
, (2)
and firm F2’s profit is given by
BL,L = pi2 =
(2b+ 1)σ2
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
+
(2b+ 1)a2
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
. (3)
We note that, in the presence of uncertainty (σ2 > 0),
taking the output decision after the resolution of the ran-
dom variable enhances firms’ payoffs since firms are now
able to make more well-informed decisions. The benefit
of making a well-informed decision is captured by the first
term in equations (2) and (3). This is called the option
value effect. This option value increases with the degree
of uncertainty. Clearly, the option value effect ceases to
prevail under certainty. In this case, waiting does not
carry any information value.
2.2 Case 2: (E,E)
In this case, both firms move early; so, firms decide their
outputs before ∆ becomes known. Maximizing firms’ ob-
jective functions, we get the following equilibrium output
levels:
q1 =
(b+ 1)a
b2 + 3b+ 1
,
q2 =
a
b2 + 3b+ 1
.
Therefore, the (ex-ante) expected social welfare is given
by
AE,E = E(W ) =
(
b3 + 5b2 + 8b+ 2
)
a2
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
, (4)
and the (ex-ante) expected firm F2’s profit is given by
BE,E = E(pi2) =
(2b+ 1)a2
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
. (5)
We observe that if σ2 = 0, then AL,L = AE,E and BL,L =
BE,E .
Furthermore, the ex-post social welfare is given by
W =
(b+ 1)
(
b2 + 4b+ 1
)
∆2 + 2
(
b3 + 5b2 + 7b+ 2
)
a∆
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
+
+
(
b3 + 5b2 + 8b+ 2
)
a2
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
, (6)
and the ex-post firm F2’s profit is given by
pi2 =
(b+ 1)
(
(3b+ 1)∆2 + 2(2b+ 1)a∆+ (b+ 1)a2
)
2 (b2 + 3b+ 1)2
.
(7)
2.3 Case 3: (E,L)
In this case, firm F1 moves early and firm F2 moves late;
so, the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader, while the
private firm is a follower. We determine the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium by backwards induction. Suppose
that the public firm F1 has chosen the output q1 in the
first stage.
Maximizing firm F2’s profit function, we get
q2(q1,∆) =
a− bq1 +∆
2b+ 1
.
Now, maximizing expected social welfare
E(W (q1, q2(q1,∆))),
knowing the above quantity q2(q1,∆), we get
q1 =
(
b2 + 3b+ 1
)
a
b3 + 7b2 + 5b+ 1
.
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By substitution, we obtain
q2 =
(2b+ 1)a
b3 + 7b2 + 5b+ 1
+
∆
2b+ 1
.
Therefore, the (ex-ante) expected social welfare is given
by
AE,L = E(W ) =
(3b+ 1)σ2
2 (2b+ 1)2
+
(
b2 + 6b+ 2
)
a2
2 (b3 + 7b2 + 5b+ 1)
,
(8)
and the (ex-ante) expected firm F2’s profit is given by
BE,L = E(pi2) =
σ2
2 (2b+ 1)
+
(2b+ 1)3a2
2 (b3 + 7b2 + 5b+ 1)2
. (9)
Furthermore, the ex-post social welfare is given by
W =
(3b+ 1)∆2
2 (2b+ 1)2
+
(
2b3 + 13b2 + 10b+ 2
)
a∆
(2b+ 1) (b3 + 7b2 + 5b+ 1)
+
+
(
b2 + 6b+ 2
)
a2
2 (b3 + 7b2 + 5b+ 1)2
, (10)
and the ex-post firm F2’s profit is given by
pi2 =
∆2
2(2b+ 1)
+ (2b+ 1)a∆+
(2b+ 1)3a2
2 (b3 + 7b2 + 5b+ 1)2
.
(11)
2.4 Case 4: (L,E)
In this case, firm F1 moves late and firm F2 moves early;
so, the public firm acts as a follower, while the private
firm is a Stackelberg leader. We determine the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium by backwards induction. Sup-
pose that the private firm F2 has chosen the output q2 in
the first stage.
Maximizing social welfare, we get
q1(q2,∆) =
a− bq2 +∆
b+ 1
.
Now, maximizing expected firm F2’s profit
E(pi2(q1(q2,∆), q2),
knowing the above quantity q1(q2,∆), we get
q2 =
a
3b+ 1
.
By substitution, we obtain
q1 =
(2b+ 1)a
(b+ 1)(3b+ 1)
+
∆
b+ 1
.
Therefore, the (ex-ante) expected social welfare is given
by
AL,E = E(W ) =
σ2
2(b+ 1)
+
(
9b2 + 10b+ 2
)
a2
2(b+ 1)(3b+ 1)2
, (12)
and the (ex-ante) expected firm F2’s profit is given by
BL,E = E(pi2) =
a2
2(b+ 1)(3b+ 1)
. (13)
Furthermore, the ex-post social welfare is given by
W =
∆2
2(b+ 1)
+
(3b+ 2)a∆
(b+ 1)(3b+ 1)
+
+
(
9b2 + 10b+ 2
)
a2
2(b+ 1)(3b+ 1)2
, (14)
and the ex-post firm F2’s profit is given by
pi2 =
a2 + 2a∆
2(b+ 1)(3b+ 1)
. (15)
3 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied a model in which timing and
output games are played between a public and a private
firm in a market with demand uncertainty. We computed
the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We
also determined ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff func-
tions.
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